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1 Few if any contemporary philosophers have done more to promote American philosophy
and philosophy in America than John Lachs. The creativity and sheer industriousness that
characterize his sixty-year career as a producer and advocate of both professional and
public philosophy are extraordinary,  while his reputation as a teacher of philosophy,
especially his work with undergraduate students, is described as “legendary” (p. 21). In
the appreciative, probing introductory essay to John Lachs’s Practical Philosophy, Herman
Saatkamp Jr. – one of Lachs’s many former students that contribute to this volume –
recounts the story of how the student newspaper at Vanderbilt University in its coverage
of  Lachs  a  receiving  university  teaching  award  attempted  to  capture  his  dynamic
teaching  style.  Saatkamp  recalls  that  the  “student  newspaper  published  not  one
photograph but a sequence of photographs of him teaching an introductory class. Each
photo captures him almost dancing across the class, raising arms, dramatically pointing
out student questions, chalk clacking against the blackboard, all with a positive intensity
that invited engagement. The student newspaper got it!” (xxi). Lachs has brought the
same  energetic  intelligence  to  bear  on  his  seminal  work  in  American  philosophy,
especially the philosophy of Santayana, and to his articles and books on social philosophy,
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medical ethics, the philosophy of education, moral philosophy, and much else besides.
Significantly, his philosophical energy and acumen are not confined to the lecture room
or study. He maintains the conviction that philosophy’s rich history and endless diversity
has something to offer to just about everyone. One of his books is titled The Relevance of
Philosophy  to  Life.  To some ears  this  might  sound like  a  rhetorical  title  in  need of  a
question mark. Not so for the man who once “received a grant to take philosophical
discourse to the annual Tennessee Fair […] rented a booth and […] gladly held forth on
moral issues” (74). Lachs not only wrote a book on the relevance of philosophy to life,
throughout his life he has embodied his philosophical ideals.
2 It is fitting, then, that John Lachs’s Practical Philosophy is indicative of Lachs’s productive
life and his philosophically edifying influence on others. The book is the outgrowth of a
four-day  international  conference  dedicated  to  his  work  that  was  held  in  2015  and
organized by the Berlin Practical Philosophy International Forum. (Like William James’s
work  before  him,  Lachs’s  pragmatist  philosophy  has  found an  appreciative  audience
beyond American shores.) The book is divided into six chapters with eighteen essays on
his  philosophy  by  scholars  from North  America  and  Europe  –  a  veritable  chorus  of
interlocutors that at turns celebrate and criticize his philosophical positions and theories.
The  first  four  chapters  address  major  themes  in  his  philosophy:  The  Practice  of
Philosophizing; Philosophical Relationships; Stoic Pragmatism; and Anthropology, Social
Ethics, and Bioethics. The fifth chapter contains an essay on “Immediacy and the Future,”
by Phil Oliver, as well as a reply to it by Lachs and his coda to the book, “Death and Self-
Importance,” a meditation on the cosmic unimportance of our personal endeavours and
the  comic  importance  we  sometimes  assign  to  them.  The  final  chapter  presents  a
“Comprehensive Bibliography of Primary and Secondary Sources” of Lachs’s work. (Lachs
reports that he has been “lazy” at different points in his life (28). One wonders when. I
counted  sixty-nine  Ph.D.  dissertations  that  he  directed  at  Vanderbilt  University  and
suspect there are more on the way.)  For those familiar with Lachs’s philosophy,  this
collection  is  essential  for  understanding  the  development  of  his  thought  and  for
providing  fresh  perspectives  on  his  work;  for  those  who  have  not  encountered  his
writings before, it will serve as a broad, accessible introduction to his ideas.
3 With the book’s subject being all of Lachs’s philosophy and with such a large assembly of
able critics discoursing on a variety of topics, there can be no tidy summary of all that the
book contains. The editor’s helpful organization of the book, however, allows the reader,
whether  he  or  she  is  familiar  with  Lachs’s  philosophy  or  not,  easy  entry  into
conversations  about  the  central  philosophical  ideas  that  animate  his  writings.  Lachs
might not be “thrilled by any isms [sic],” as he retorts to McReynolds who characterizes
his philosophy rather cumbersomely as “proto-posthumanism”; yet he adheres to many
of the “isms” associated with classical American philosophy, in particular, pragmatism,
fallibilism, and ameliorism (58). It is perhaps “ameliorism” that is the main driver of his
philosophical thinking. For he is concerned above all with the individual finding ways to
construct a meaningful existence in a life-granting but impersonal cosmos and a vast
world of complex social connections. 
4 In the Prologue, Lachs states that he agreed to participate in this examination of his ideas
on one condition: that his work be vigorously criticized. “I asked that you call attention to
my errors,” he writes, “and suggest ways in which they may be corrected.” He adds that
he is (mercifully) not asking for “the old APA system of scorching the ground from which
ideas sprout,” but the other kind of criticism which is “the fair assessment of the value of
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ideas with suggestions of where they fall short.” He further adds that he has abandoned
his views before (e.g. epiphenomenalism) and is willing to do so again. Indeed, he claims
that  “I  have  read your  critiques  and started using  them,”  although it  is  not  always
apparent where and how he has begun using the constructive criticisms levelled against
him (xxvi).
5 Given the immense task of responding to so many critics on a wide range of topics, it is
perhaps not surprising that Lachs’s replies often seem a little clipped when compared to
the meticulous expositions of his work. In responding to critics, he tends to reiterate and
not amend or further develop his views. For example, Michael Hodges in his essay, “Lachs
on Transcendence: Art’s Relation to the Life of Reason,” argues against Lachs that there is
an unbridgeable conceptual and moral divide between what Santayana calls “the life of
reason” and “the spiritual life.” For Hodges, the former is engaged in pressure-filled self-
care  while  the  latter  is  categorically  “disinterested.”  “This  is  a  conflict  and  an
unresolvable one,” he states (10). In response to this unresolvable conflict, Lachs simply
restates his view that as a matter of fact “battling for good and effortless immediacy […]
capture the attention of people at different times and especially different stages of life”
(15).  Similarly,  Krzysztof  Piotr  Skowroński  in  his  essay,  “John  Lachs’s  Relativism  in
Philosophical  Education  as  Seen  from  a  Practical  Perspective,”  argues  that  some  of
Lachs’s  prescriptions  for  teachers  of  philosophy must  “transcend particular  views or
relative statements, and judge them in the name of a common or universal good.” As
Skowroński sees it, Lachs “assumes more or less openly” a “universal platform” of values
that  is  the  true  ground  of  his  prescriptions  (65).  Lachs’s  reply  to  this  charge  is  a
straightforward reaffirmation of his moral relativism. “We have,” he writes, “a precise
answer to the question whether there are universally valid values.  There are,  to the
extent that there are universally shared natures” (74). And in reply to Michael Brodrick’s
essay,  “Mediation  and Its  Discontents,”  in  which  Brodrick  argues  that  Lachs’s  “lofty
ideals” regarding education reform – in particular, having students spend more time
actively learning in the community and less time in the classroom - would be detrimental
to education of “the traditional liberal kind,” Lachs flatly asserts that “I don’t think that
liberal education on the college level must be or should remain intellectual” (258-67). To
be sure, at times Lachs does embrace the concerns of his critics, such as with Patrick
Shade and his sensitive essay “Facing Death: Preparing for Dying as a Social Process,” but
this appears to be mainly because he regards Shade’s critique “as enriching developments
of my ideas rather than outright critiques” (283).
6 In a couple of instances, Lachs’s replies appear more defensive than resolute. Andrew
Fiala,  in his generally laudatory essay “Lachs, Liberty,  and the Pursuit of Happiness,”
takes Lachs to task for advocating specific social programs without supporting empirical
data. While Fiala praises Lachs as a “deft stylist” – Lachs’s lucid prose style is by design
non-technical and he prides himself on writing without footnotes – he objects that when
Lachs  makes  normative  claims  about  social  programs  such  as  “public  health  care,
unemployment insurance, the social security system, and the food stamp program [in
America]  […] the footnotes are lacking.” In Fiala’s view,  “[d]ebates about such topics
require empirical support that must be grounded in empirical data” (103). This claim does
not seem particularly controversial, so Lachs’s reply to it is puzzling. He writes that “the
test of such theories is not the number of supportive footnotes but their tendency to yield
insight,”  adding  that  “no  science  is  objective  and  salient  examples  convey  more
immediately accessible information than scientific charts” (114). Setting aside the claim
Krzysztof Piotr Skowronski (ed.), John Lachs’s Practical Philosophy: Critical...
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-2 | 2018
3
that “no science is objective,” it is unclear why Lachs would be resistant to empirical data
indicating  whether  or  not,  say,  welfare  programs  promote  dependence.  After  all,
empirical data provides “insight” too and the reference to “scientific charts” seems like a
straw-man. A similar note of defensiveness also arises in Lachs’s reply to Richard Rubin’s
essay “Lachs vs. Santayana.” Lachs has long defended an interpretation of Santayana’s
system  of  philosophy  where  “matter”  is  identified  with  “existence.”  Lachs’s
interpretation runs contrary to a thesis defended by other Santayana scholars which
holds  that  while  “matter”  certainly  exists  it  always  has  some form or  “essence.”  In
Rubin’s  estimation,  Lachs’s  insistence  that  Santayana  must  have  in  mind  a  “purely
ontological idea of matter is […] an imposition of a foreign ontology into Santayana’s
using Santayana’s own vocabulary” (120). In his reply to Rubin, Lachs restates his view
that  matter  is  “the  inarticulate  counterpart  to  essence,”  but  he  also  prefaces  his
restatement  with  the  “wry”  comment  that  “I  could  not  avoid  asking  myself  what
difference it would make if I got Santayana’s ideas wrong.” Although he grants that it
might “make sense to correct misreadings of  Santayana,  partly because his ideas are
interesting and fruitful and partly because his texts are difficult and his commentators
few,” his initial reply seems incongruous with the invitation to criticize his work and the
seminal Santayana scholarship he has produced.
7 Santayana once described his own philosophy as “eclectic.” For him, this term wasn’t
pejorative, but rather signalled the diverse influences on his thought and his firmness
grounding his philosophy in common sense and everyday experience. Lachs’s philosophy
is similarly “eclectic.” It is influenced by the entire history of philosophy, albeit with an
emphasis on American pragmatism, and more recently Stoicism, and it is grounded in
common  sense  and  everyday  experience.  This  allows  him  to  avoid  doctrinaire  and
idiosyncratic assumptions that might lead to intellectual dogmatism and moralism or
otherwise distort the clear-minded ideas and practical proposals he presents. Also like
Santayana,  Lachs in his  writing soars to the higher reaches of  speculation about the
nature of existence and the divine without losing sight of the mundane and the practical
interests of human life. Lachs writes that “I have been scribbling for about sixty years, but
it will take less than a tenth of that my time for my ideas to be forgotten.” But he adds
that  “[n]either  my  authorship  nor  my  specific  theories  matter  so  long  as  my  work
contributes to the great turn of philosophy away from irrelevant abstraction toward its
historical mission of serving as a guide to life” (26). If the essays in the present volume
are any indication, he is happily wrong on the first point and certainly correct on the
second. Those who wish to see philosophy that is relevant to life flourish both inside and
outside the university can take heart knowing that Lachs’s amelioristic ideas have been
set in motion.
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